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Beitrag zur Ad-hoc-Gruppe »Die krisenhafte Pluralität und due praktische Krise der instituti-onellen Routinen und Koordinationslogiken« – organisiert von Rainer Diaz-Bone 
Current research argues that competing institutional logics1 can co-exist enduringly and investi-
gates how organizations cope with such institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011). 
Thereby, the role of practices for handling competing logics has been overlooked and it is cur-
rently only to limited extent understood how organizations establish compromises between 
competing logics. Therefore, we investigated the recent performance appraisal reform of a 
German public sector organization that occurred in 2008 (see also Kozica, Brandl 2015). BAND 
(the pseudonym for our organization) has been using performance appraisals for several dec-
ades, and performance appraisals have already become entrenched instruments (Zeitz, Mittal, 
McAulay 1999) for handling staff promotion decisions. While BAND accepted the accountability 
logic of the performance appraisal, the professional logic (which is based on trust and comrade-
ship as a high value of being professional in our organization) is accepted too and BAND has 
established a fine-grained compromise between the different logics. During the recent reform 
of the performance appraisal system, however, this compromise has broken up and challenged 
organizational members to (re-) arrange a compromise. By using French convention school of 
thinking (Boltanski, Thévenot 2006) we address how BAND copes with conflicting logics by form-
ing compromises in organizational practices. Thereby, we show that the concept of convention 
is particularly promising for understanding of how organizations deal with institutional com-
plexity. More broadly, our argument contributes to the elaboration of an organizational theory 
for the institutional logics discussion that explains how organizational and individual actions are 
interlinked.   
—————— 
 1 Institutional logics are »the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality« (Thornton, Ocasio 1999: 804) 
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Conceptual Background 
Coping with institutional complexity: state of research 
The institutional logics perspective states that different institutional logics operate in society, 
each representing its own sphere of norms, values, and accepted practices as well as providing 
different building blocks of identity (Friedland, Alford 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury 2012;). 
Organizations are exposed to multiple institutional logics, and this raises the question of how 
organizations internally respond to such conflicting demands (Pache, Santos 2010; Greenwood 
et al. 2011). Most answers of researchers on this question are anchored in basic assumptions 
about the nature of organizations as coalitions of members (Cyert, March 1963) and micro-
political arenas (Crozier, Friedberg 1977). Yet, the question of how organizations establish an 
organization-wide compromise between competing logics in face of competing pressures re-
mains only partially answered through research based on the coalition model of organizations. 
Our research contributes to addressing this gap by introducing the notion of convention. The 
next section elaborates how the French convention school deals with institutional complexity 
and how hybrid organizational practices are established.   
French convention school: organizations as compromises between logics  
Along with the institutional logics perspective, conventions share an interest in explaining how 
actors and organizations cope with institutional complexity (Thévenot 2001a; Cloutier, Langley, 
2013; Jagd 2011). Three assumptions on how French convention school conceptualizes organi-
zations and their members are important within the discussion of institutional complexity.  
First, French convention school sees organizations generally as »compromises« between differ-
ent institutional logics (›modes of coordination‹) (Thévenot 2001a: 405). In other words, French 
convention school generally assumes that organizations face institutional complexity. Further, 
convention theory explicitly stresses that actors have critical and reflexive competencies (Ey-
mard-Duvernay 2002: 71) and that they are able to make compromises between different logics 
by establishing conventions. Such compromises are agreements that »bring local and temporal 
compatibility between« different logics (Thévenot 2001a: 410).  
Second, the French convention school assumes compromises between logics are embedded 
in conventions (Thévenot 2001b). Conventions are frameworks or social heuristics (Beamish, 
Biggart 2010) that facilitate coordinated activities in (Gomez, Jones 2000; Thévenot 1984; Kozica 
et al. 2014) and between organizations (Eymard-Duvernay 2002; Lazega, Favereau 2002; Thé-
venot 2001a). They serve as interpretative schemes by which actors interpret rules and how 
they could be put into practice.  
Third, conventions are not natural entities or simply »found« in the environment of organiza-
tions, but rather are established through organizational members. If rules change, organiza-
tional actors face uncertainty because they cannot take the existing conventions for granted any 
more. This is an opportunity for adjusting conventions.  
The French convention school can significantly contribute to understanding how organiza-
tions cope with institutional complexity. We show this in our empirical case study by analyzing 
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what happens when actors are exposed to a regulation, looking at how these organizational 
members establish a compromise between different logics and embed this compromise into a 
convention, and describing what the resulting convention looks like. These are the main ques-
tions our following case study addresses.  
Research Context and Methodology 
Performance appraisal systems and the setting of our study 
Performance appraisals are formal mechanisms or rules for making systematic judgments 
about the achievements of employees, and they can enable the organization to make decisions 
on staffing, training, and rewarding employees (Tichy, Fombrun, Devanna 1982). As for the rea-
sons for using performance appraisals, practitioners and researchers often invoke the fact that 
they bring higher efficiency and effectiveness to public organizations (e.g. Grote 2000). Perfor-
mance appraisals are thus based on an accountability logic which is seen as a part of a wider 
managerialism that has increasingly permeated the public sector (Moynihan 2008; Townley 1997).  
Research has primarily analyzed the process of permeation of the accountability logic and 
the conflicts that accompany this permeation. Performance appraisals are then seen as an in-
strument where different logics collide – especially in public sector organizations – and where 
different organizational coalitions struggle to use »their« logic to inform concrete practices. For 
instance, Townley (1997) has shown that the organizational members of universities are in a 
position of managerial responsibility to accept the accountability logic of performance apprais-
als and introduced this practice when the pressure to do so has increased. Academics of these 
universities, however, have resisted the emphasis on the accountability logic. »Their« institu-
tional logic of academic professionalism forms a normative and cognitive basis of critique and 
resistance. By stressing different interests between actors, this research offers valuable insights 
when performance appraisals are introduced into public sector organizations and in this way, a 
new logic enters the organization. It fails, however, to explain settings in which the same organi-
zational actors face institutional complexity. Our case study at BAND is one such setting. 
The personnel management and the performance appraisal system of BAND 
BAND, the public organisation in our empirical case study, is a governmental organisation ruled 
by a ministry. It has over 10,000 members (civil servants and public sector workers). Personnel 
management is located in several different parts of the organisation. Hierarchically, the highest 
office of personnel management is a special department at the ministry, and is responsible for 
central affairs, social affairs and personnel (ASP). ASP is directly superior to the HR Division, which 
is the highest authority for personnel management at BAND. The HR Division shares responsibil-
ity with ASP for the principles of personnel management and for the most important operative 
decisions. At the operative levels of BAND, personnel management is carried out through first 
line managers (superiors) such as team leaders or department chiefs. A small staff of HRM pro-
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fessionals (HR staff) assists superiors, mainly with administrative tasks and by delivering specific 
knowledge. Figure 1 depicts the structure of personnel management at BAND.  
Fig. 1: The structure of personnel management at BAND 
 As with all public organisations in Germany, BAND operates under the German public service 
code (Bundesbeamtengesetz). This law requires organisations to hire and promote those candi-
dates with the highest ›aptitude‹, ›qualification‹ and ›professional achievement‹ (BBG § 9, our 
translation). Although it is widely accepted that errors occur even in the most sophisticated per-
formance appraisal, BAND takes for granted that performance appraisals are an appropriate 
tool for personnel decisions. BAND has been using performance appraisal systems since its 
foundation shortly after World War II. BAND’s performance appraisal system is defined by the 
Central Regulation for Performance Appraisals (CRPA) and several implementing provisions.  
Performance appraisal systems assemble many people with different organisational roles, 
competencies and responsibilities. Based on their position in the organisation they enact regu-
lations and implement provisions (e.g. ASP), conduct performance appraisals (superiors) or dis-
tribute social goods (HR Division). The information which is codified in conducted performance 
appraisals is relevant for personnel decisions such as promotions, personnel placements, and 
the selection of civil servants who are able to graduate from middle-level to upper-level. The HR 
Division is responsible for such decisions. Table 1 lists the personnel who take part in the per-









Hierarchical level 1 HR staff
Hierarchical level 3 HR staff
Hierarchical level 2 HR staff
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Tab. 1: Task division in the performance appraisal system at BAND 
Organisational units of BAND Tasks in the performance appraisal system 
Ministry/ASP 
(Ministry and the special de-partment for central affairs, social affairs and personnel)  
̶ Enactment of general regulations and implementation require-ments 
̶ Leading of subordinate units, especially the HR Division  
HR Division  
̶ Enactment of implementation regulations  
̶ Moderation of the performance appraisal process (e.g. timeline, different conferences for reconciliation of results) 
̶ Control of accuracy and completeness of performance apprais-als 
̶ Distribution of social goods based upon the performance ap-praisals  
HR staff in subordinate units  
̶ Moderation of the performance appraisal process within their area of responsibility and within the superior regulations (e.g. timeline, conferences for reconciliation of results) 
̶ Control of accuracy and completeness of performance apprais-als 
Superiors (Team leaders, etc.)  ̶ Appraisal of their subordinates, especially the accomplishment of their performance appraisals  
HR staff (related to superiors) 
̶ Assisting superiors  
̶ Moderation of the performance appraisal process within their organisational unit (e.g. timeline, different conferences for rec-onciliation of results) and within superior regulations  
Comment: Pseudonyms are in italics (e.g. HR Division) whereas formal descriptions (e.g. HR staff) are in roman type.  
In the years 1987 and 1998, the CRPA was changed substantially, leading to an ever more so-
phisticated performance appraisal system. Basically, superiors appraise civil servants from a 
specific pay grade every two years. ASP is responsible for developing the CRPA regulation and is 
officially enacted by the undersecretary of the ministry. The HR Division develops most imple-
menting provisions. Further, organisational subunits are allowed to enact implementation pro-
visions for their scope of responsibility.  
The change of the performance appraisal system: tightening the rules 
The most recent change in regulations took place in 2008. The reason for this reform was that 
people engaged in the old performance appraisal system (used until 2008) increasingly experi-
enced dysfunctions. One of the main problems was that too many appraised civil servants 
earned high scores in their performance appraisal, making it difficult for personnel managers in 
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the HR Division to select the best from the good (a well-known phenomenon of evaluating per-
formance; see Meyer, Gupta 1994; Thiel, Leeuw 2002). This can be illustrated by the following 
statement from our interviews:  
The old systems had no power anymore because too many soldiers received a 6.8 [with an absolute best 
average of 7 out of 16 items, comment added by the authors]. A comparison was no longer possible; there-
fore something new had to be created. 
Although the HR Division was still able to identify candidates for personnel decisions (it never 
stopped doing so), BAND faced difficulties in legitimising its decisions. This raised a problem and 
in tackling this problem, BAND decided to establish ›clearer structures‹ (Wilson, 2002: 628). ASP 
introduced a new central regulation for the performance appraisal system (CRPA). The new CRPA 
contained several new rules. In our study, we focus on the ›20/80‹ rule, because this rule caused 
the most uncertainty and intense critiques (as we found in our interviews). This rule is described 
below.  
̶ Performance appraisals are conducted within defined reference groups of appraisees (e.g. 
following their ranks). In these reference groups, however, there are often subordinates of 
different superiors. Superiors hence have to coordinate the performance appraisal ratings of 
their subordinates with other superiors. Reference groups are governed and coordinated by, 
for instance, HR staff in a regional division (i.e. on a ›middle‹ hierarchical level).  
̶ Superiors are rigorously forced to rank the appraised civil servants of a reference group in a 
sequential order (that means into the best, the second best, etc. down to the ›worst‹).  
̶ Superiors have to separate a group of top performers. The top 20 per cent are allowed to 
have an arithmetical average score of 7.5 (with the best score being 9) and the other 80 per 
cent must have an average score of 5.5.  
The difference between the old and new regulation is best described by the following statement 
of one of the interviewees:  
However, in the old system there has been the opportunity for appraising superiors […] How can I describe 
this? […] I was in the function of a group leader. As a group leader, I have written appraisals for my superior 
[who was responsible for the appraisals of the civil servants, comment added by the authors]. When I told my 
superior that I have two high-performance team members, I was able to assess them both notably positive-
ly. Now when I have two high-performance team members, I have to tell one of them, ›You are worse, 
therefore you are assessed as downgraded‹. 
It was this against background that we conducted our case study, of which the mythological 
aspects are explained in the next section.  
Data and methodology 
Our primary data set consists of 30 interviews (approximately 30-60 minutes long) and internal 
written documents (regulations and implementation provisions). The interviews were conducted 
in 2009, when the first systematic rounds of performance evaluations took place, and cover 
different parts of the performance appraisal system. Thirteen are with staff members in the HR 
Division (mainly responsible for implementing provisions and the distribution of social goods 
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like promotions), eleven with HR staff in operative departments of the HR Division, and two in-
terviews were conducted with the department head and her deputy. Six interviews were with 
HR staff at different hierarchical levels (division and units) and thirteen interviews were with 
superiors. Data collection was based on episodic interviewing (Flick 2000). This type of interview-
ing is designed to activate respondents to select relevant situations within a domain and to de-
scribe the objects, terms, and conditions that make these situations relevant to them. In each 
interview, respondents were asked similar questions, for example, if you look back, what were 
your most recent experiences with the performance appraisal in this organization? How do 
these experiences differ from your former experiences? Do you recall a situation where you 
made a positive [negative] experience with the performance appraisal in this organization? The 
issues raised in these questions were elaborated by questions for illustrations and specifica-
tions. We have depicted further details on our research method elsewhere (Kozica, Brandl 
2015).   
Case Analysis 
Reactions to the changes of the performance appraisal system  
The old system allowed superiors to follow the professional logic of being a good comrade to a 
certain extent. Within the old performance appraisal system, superiors were able to rate most 
of their appraised civil servants numerically with high scores. Thereby, it was partially possible 
to disguise (relatively) bad performance ratings. This is due to the average scores of all perfor-
mance appraisals at BAND not being transparent. Overall, scores have inflated over the years. In 
some occupational groups and pay levels (e.g., technical middle-level civil servants), the average 
score of the 16 appraisal items was 6.4 on a 7,0 rating scale (!) for outstanding performance. 
Hence, even a score of 6.3 was beyond the average and not a good performance appraisal rat-
ing. This, however, has often not been recognized by appraisees who receive performance ap-
praisals beyond the average scores. One reason for this was that average scores increased eve-
ry year and, to say it simply, a 6.3 on a scale of up to 7,0 sounds good. Essentially, the old per-
formance appraisal system allowed superiors to disguise performance ratings and to avoid 
responsibility. Our interviewees described this, for instance, as follows: 
This juxtaposition […] always existed. However, it wasn't openly communicated. Then there was the differ-
ence between 6,07 and 6,08, deciding who will become an upper-level civil servant and who not. But every-
one had the feeling that he was judged well, the superior was out of the woods, and said, »I did all sorts of 
things for you.« 
Even when superiors appraise civil servants in accordance with their (perceived) bad perfor-
mance, they have not been forced to communicate this in a face-to-face dialog. This was actually 
rationalized in the organization and followed their professional logic of being a good comrade 
and colleague as well as supporting and caring for each other. Although the consequences for 
the appraised organizational member had been the same (e.g., no promotion), the interperson-
al relationship between a superior and their appraised civil servant was not negatively affected. 
The old performance appraisal system, as it was enacted in practice, was thus a compromise 
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between different logics (Townley 1997, 2002). However, the new system, especially the 20/80-
rule, limited the scope of superiors since rankings have to be communicated and scores have to 
follow strict rules. This rules caused trouble because superiors did not enact purely on the ac-
countability logic but rather still followed their professional logic. 
Making compromise by establishing a convention 
About one year after the new regulation, CRPA initiated the first systematic round of conducting 
performance appraisals. In this first round, superiors had to appraise their middle-level civil 
servants (simultaneously at every part of BAND). Due to the fact that the former way of conduct-
ing performance appraisals was no longer amenable, a critical situation for superiors emerged. 
Since rules are generally incomplete, the question of how to put the new regulation into prac-
tice arose among HR staff and superiors. Organizational actors realized this, as we can see in 
the following statement from one of our interviewees:  
Indeed, it is said that you are to abide by the regulation, but you have to learn that in time. Truly, the regu-
lation is one side of the story, but how to put the regulation into practice […]? Certainly, you have to work 
along the regulation, but experience shows you which opportunities you have. 
Putting the regulation into praxis, however, is an interindividual effort rather than an individual 
one. Performance appraisal systems in organizations integrate different people within the or-
ganization (here, superiors, HR staff members, and personnel managers at the HR Division). All 
of these organizational members (despite being located in different areas of the organization) 
had to negotiate the rule change and had to establish a shared understanding.  
What happened at BAND in this phase? Superiors evaluated the new situation, identified 
problems with the new regulations, and formulated criticisms in daily talks, meetings, written 
statements, and complaints. In other words, the organization was in turmoil (Hallett 2010). Su-
periors criticized the new system, for instance, increasing bureaucracy, lowering practicability, 
and creating the need to coordinate with other superiors when appraisees were in the same 
reference group. These criticisms did not trigger new reform processes in themselves, but ra-
ther are a part of the current reform process which has already been initiated. BAND recognized 
these criticisms and organized different ›round tables‹, workshops, and conferences. Further-
more, the new performance appraisal system was a topic at the highest hierarchical level be-
neath the ministry itself. These venues have been used for formulating criticisms and discussing 
possible solutions. The HR Division made some minor adaptations of the formal regulations by 
issuing new implementing provisions. Thereby, they »absorbed« some of the criticisms. 
With these activities, organizational members established a convention of how to conduct 
performance appraisals. In what follows, we depict the content of this convention and show 
how different logics are embedded in this convention. Hereby, we will focus on the »20/80-rule« 
which has engendered massive criticism. Basically, we have identified two ways of how superi-
ors reacted: they did identity work by stressing their »proper role« and they negotiated a com-
promise between accountability and professional logic on how to perform the appraisal.  
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Stressing the proper role of superiors  
The new 20/80-rule and the need for a detailed ranking of appraised civil servants had a serious 
consequence: superiors were not able to partially disguise their performance appraisal ratings 
anymore. The following statement expresses the conflict which had been solved in the old sys-
tem, but became a problem in the new performance appraisal system:  
However, as the boss, I get into trouble, I have to explain that exactly. And I have – when I inform number 
17, 18, 19 about their performance appraisal – a huge emotional problem. Formerly, I could write, »Yes, he 
is in the inferior third«. That was indeed bad, but it didn’t let on that he was the worst. And that is exactly 
the different in the new performance appraisal system. As the boss, you have to be straightforward and 
you have to explain exactly. On the other hand, I have the advantage (there is an advantage) that the good 
ones, the number 1, 2, 3 are at least seen as what they are: the best three people. 
Superiors coped with this problem by using identity work that binds their identity more strongly 
to the accountability logic (see also Lok 2010; Meyer, Hammerschid 2006). Superiors confirm to 
each other (and themselves) that the proper role of superiors in performance appraisal systems 
is to assess and rank their civil servants, even if this is part of directly communicating with their 
civil servants or not. One superior told us, for instance, that the old performance appraisal sys-
tem offers the possibility of »avoiding responsibility«, another stressed that there are »only very 
few [superiors, added by the authors], who have the courage to say, ›you are a bad guy‹«. How-
ever, both citied superiors stressed that this is exactly the role of superiors in a proper sense. Fol-
lowing this idea, the new performance appraisal system reminds superiors or – more plainly – 
forces them to fulfill their role. From this perspective, the ›tightening of the iron cage‹ works, 
because superiors are forced to enact the accountability logic of the performance appraisal 
system.  
Pawn Sacrifice  
Stressing the role of the superior was not the only reaction to coping with the new rule. By es-
tablishing average scores with a compulsory distribution over the performance rating scale, the 
new performance appraisal system limited space for good performance appraisals. Simply stat-
ed, every good rating has its bad counterpart. As a brief illustration: a superior has ten civil 
servants to appraise, the best two (20 per cent) are allowed to have an average score of about 
7.5. This could be matched by giving them both a 7.5 or through giving them an 8 and a 7. Fol-
lowing the abstract idea of a performance appraisal system, this decision should be solely 
based on individual performance. Superiors, however, feel responsible for supporting »their 
soldiers« to achieve, for instance, by promotion. This requires performance appraisals which are 
›good‹ enough (in comparison to others) to get access to social goods distributed by the HR 
Division. Since the 80/20-rule limits good performance appraisals, superiors negotiated a new 
mechanism: the ›pawn sacrifice‹. By conducting performance appraisals, superiors tried to iden-
tify civil servants who were currently not dependent on a good performance appraisal, inde-
pendent from their individual performance. This offers the opportunity to score other civil serv-
ants higher and support their careers. The following quotation illustrates this argument:  
10 J U L I A  B R A N D L ,  A R J A N  K O Z I C A  
You try to bend the system […].Well, who has not had a turn for career advancement? That is, a middle-level 
civil servant, 28 years old, newly given his civil service status, will become upper-level civil servant in ? years 
at the earliest. He doesn't need a 7,5 right now. I will explain that to him and say: Hey, you get a 4,0 right 
now and you have the chance in the next 12 years / six benchmarks, to build yourself up (...). Sure, they are 
wondering, »Didn't I achieve anything so far?«. 
The »pawn sacrifice« – albeit, against the official regulation – is an accepted mechanism used to 
conduct performance appraisals. It is not an individual interpretation or an individual attempt to 
extract advantages. Rather, superiors negotiated the legitimate use of pawn sacrifices as a cul-
turally accepted way to put the new regulation into practice. For instance, the new regulation 
was intensively discussed at a meeting where the superiors and HR staff from a regional divi-
sion and representatives from the HR Division discussed the new performance appraisal system. 
In this discussion, superiors confirmed each other that this, although not covered by the regula-
tion, is a commonly accepted strategy in conducting performance appraisals. Representatives of 
the HR Division (at this meeting but also through house journals, information letters, etcetera), 
however, stressed that pawn sacrifices are an applications error). They rhetorically threatened 
to diminish the use of pawn sacrifices through, for instance, education or tight leadership. This, 
however, has actually not inhibited superiors from openly confirming to each other in confer-
ences and daily talks that using pawn sacrifices is a legitimate way to conduct performance ap-
praisals. The use of the pawn sacrifice is generalized through negotiation which leads to a rela-
tively stable compromise between different logics. The accountability logic of the performance 
appraisal system is generally accepted, but superiors strive to support ›their‹ subordinates be-
cause of a sense of comradeship and feelings of care (professional logic) (Townley 2002). There-
by, they counteract the basic idea of the performance appraisal system.  
 Entrenchment of the compromise  
Negotiated results were anchored in a commonly shared understanding of how to conduct per-
formance appraisals and further in written documents (implementation provisions, reports, 
emails). This process resulted in an organizational performance appraisal convention in which 
artifacts (written documents) and shared understandings emerged from complexes which 
frame individual actions (here, in performing performance appraisals). As previous arrange-
ments were no longer operating, the convention enables organizational members to anticipate 
how to handle the regulation, and in particular to prioritize people in the rankings. Furthermore, 
it enables them to locate themselves in the organization, and to exercise their roles as superi-
ors. In doing so, the convention reduces insecurity in coordination. At the same time, this stabil-
ity is a compromise between different institutional logics (Townley 2002), namely between ac-
countability logic (represented mainly by the performance appraisal system) and professional 
logic (being a good comrade and colleague).  
In our case, the new performance appraisal convention at BAND ›works‹ and paves the way 
for an efficient accomplishment of performance appraisals for the coming years. Organizational 
members try to avoid a the fragility that is still inherent in the convention for as long as possi-
ble. For instance, they repeatedly confirm to each other in daily communications, routines, and 
 CO M P E T I N G  L O G I C S  I N  E V A L U A T I N G  E M P L O Y E E  P E R F O R M A N C E   11  
rituals that the social order is ›objectively‹ existent and that this order is more or less just and 
reasonable (Boltanki, Thévenot 2006). These stable times, however, are not enduring. Rather, 
there are situations in which uncertainty becomes obvious, disturbance prevails, and where 
people are assailed by doubts (Wagner 1999: 424–425; see also Brunsson 1985: 37–43). This 
probably will lead to a new reform of the performance appraisal system.  
Conclusion 
The aim of our research was to understand how organizations internally cope with competing 
institutional logics. Faced with institutional complexity, as our study shows, organizational 
members actively search for solutions on how to combine different institutional logics that they 
are exposed to. Since actors cannot independently interpret and apply the regulation in organi-
zational practices bringing different actors together, organizational members must negotiate 
shared understandings on how to combine different logics. We found that over time organiza-
tional members established a shared understanding about how they make compromises be-
tween different logics when they conduct performance appraisals. In order to capture this phe-
nomenon, we use insights from French convention school (Thévenot 1984; Boltanski, Thévenot 
1999, 2006), a perspective that is receiving an increasing amount of attention in the field of or-
ganizational studies (Cloutier, Langley 2013; Jagd 2011). One core assumption of French conven-
tion school is that organizational members handle uncertainty in dealing with regulations by 
establishing conventions. Conventions impart information on how organizational members 
shall align conflicting institutional logics. By analyzing this organizational reform, we show how 
the conflict between different logics is resolved by establishing a convention. The notion of 
»conventions« improves our understanding of how hybrid practices are employed in organiza-
tions. It allows us to, first, describe what a hybrid practices consists of (in order to be employa-
ble) and how these practices relate to organizational actors (i.e. the situations in which they are 
employed), and second, describe how these practices come into existence by the activities of 
organizational members.  
Our case study shows that the new performance appraisal convention at BAND tends to 
stress the formal responsibilities of superiors and increases the importance of accountability 
logic, while still recognizing professional logic for conducting appraisals. This outcome may be 
specific to the circumstances of our case setting and further research would be needed to show 
what causes variation in reform outcomes. In spite of this, there are also findings that are more 
general. First, we assume that such compromises can also be found in performance appraisal 
systems in other public sector organizations, but that there might be specific logics that differ 
between organizations. This is due to debates (or institutional demands) varying across time 
and space. Second, our study shows how organizational members negotiate a compromise 
between different logics after a new ambiguous regulation has been issued. Activities of organi-
zational members such as raising criticism, issuing several implementing provisions, and nego-
tiating shared understandings in daily talks and in conferences, are generally part of establish-
ing compromises between competing logics. 
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